Abstract
Introduction
Information sharing may offset the bullwhip effect to improve performance, to lower costs and to reduce inventory in supply chain (Lee, et al. 1997a , Lee, et al. 1997b , Chen, 2000 , but Z. Huang (2004 Huang ( , 2005 and L. Li (2002) etc. also point out that information sharing does not increase the profits of retailers. So appropriate incentive mechanisms must be designed to make retailers willing to share their private information with manufacturers (Huang,2004 , Huang,2005 , Li,2002 . Cachon et al.(2001) study how to share forecast demand information through contract in a supply chain with one manufacturer that faces stochastic demand for a single product and one supplier. Their results show that optimal supply chain performance requires the manufacturer to share her initial forecast truthfully, but she has an incentive to inflate her forecast to induce the supplier to build more capacity. Raghunathan (2003) analyzes the value of demand information sharing in a one manufacturer-N retailer model in which demands of retailers may be correlated during a time period. Their analyses show that the demand correlation affects the magnitude and shape of the surplus function generated from information sharing. According to Stackelberg game model Zhang et al. (2004) study how to optimize supply prices and guide retailers to actively participate in information sharing from the perspective of the upper supplier in the supply chain. Li (2002) considers the strategy of price discrimination for retailers, but he believes that there is no incentive to use the strategy for supplier in pursuit of profit maximization because supplier must pay for additional information costs in order to encourage retailers to participate in information sharing. Liu et al. (2007) analyze a pricing incentive model in a distributed supply chain. From the perspective of the supplier, they further propose the use of price discrimination strategy to encourage retailers to participate in information sharing in a distributed supply chain with one single supplier and multiple retailers under constrained profit maximization. However, their study of the value and game analysis of information sharing is conducted only in the traditional supply chain.
With the rapid development of internet and the progress of information technology, e-commerce promotes changes of the structure in supply chain. Now many manufactures and suppliers establish direct sales channel through E-tailors while traditional sales channels remain unchanged. It is prevalent that direct sales channels and traditional sales channels coexist. The coordination mechanisms of such a hybrid dual channels in supply chain are new hot spots for studying. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) study the coordination mode of the dynamic channel structure in price and service competition. Further, Tsay and Agrawal (2004) analyze the structural properties of channels conflict with direct channel and coordination how to adjust manufacturer-reseller relationship in the E-commerce age. study the wholesale prices in the structure of mixed retail channels and get the different optimal wholesale prices under Betrand and Stackelberg competition. Chiang et al. (2003) study the strategic analysis and analyze the basic framework and dynamic coordination mechanism in dual channel supply chain. Chiang and Monahan (2005) study how to manage inventories in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain with a traditional retail store and an Internet-enabled direct channel. Hisashi et al. (2007) analyze channel pricing coordination mechanism in multiple distribution channels between different brands with a direct channel and an indirect channel. Yao et al. (2009) study and compare the performance of three different inventory strategies for retail and e-tail stores to obtain the their respective optimal inventory levels and the respective expected profits in retail and e-tail stores.
The information sharing in the dual-channel supply chain has also become the new direction of research. Is the information sharing valuable in the dual-channel supply chain? Is the value of information sharing in the dual-channel supply chain the same in traditional sale channel? When is it valuable in the dual-channel supply chain? How is it valuable in the dual-channel supply chain? All these problems need to be addressed. analyze the impact of information sharing on a returns policy with the addition of a direct channel. Their study results show that information sharing is profitable for manufacturers and retailers. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) study the information sharing of value-adding retailer in a mixed channel hi-tech supply chain. According to their designed models retailers are willing to participate in information sharing. Yue and Liu (2004) assess the benefits of sharing demand forecast information in a manufacturer-retailer dual-channel supply chain with a traditional retail channel and a direct e-channel [19] . They find that the direct channel has a negative impact on the retailers' performance, and, under some conditions, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are better off.
In this study, there are different perspectives from their research. The study follows three aspects: (1)Dual channels exist in supply chain with electronic direct channel and retail channels for manufacturers, and the coordination is needed between electronic direct channel and retail channels; (2)It is uncertain whether retailers share private demand information which impacts certain performance of supply chain; (3) Price discrimination strategy is adopted, and retailers' wholesale prices are different whether to participate in information sharing. In order to encourage retailers to participate in information sharing, the wholesale prices from the manufacturer to the retailers to participate in information sharing are lower than to other retailers not to participate in to share information. In this paper we consider information sharing model in a dual channel supply chain with one manufacturer who establishes an electronic direct channel and two retailers. In the research model price discrimination strategy is adopted to encourage retailers to participate in information sharing. According to the difference in two retailers whether to participate in information sharing, the model includes three cases: (1) retailers R1 and R2 are involved in information sharing; (2)retailer R1 participates in information sharing while retailer R2 does not participate in information sharing; (3)retailers R1 and R2 are not involved in information sharing.
In this paper, the optimal equilibrium solution and their profits of the foregoing three cases are respectively solved. Then the impacts of information sharing in dual-channel supply chain are analyzed through comparing equilibrium result to discover how to incent retailers to actively participate in information sharing and to realize the value of information sharing, to make electronic direct marketing and retail channels cooperate and win-win, and to improve the supply chain system performance.
Information-sharing Model in Dual-channel Supply chain
In this paper, the information sharing incentive model is built according to two retailers whether to share uncertain demand information in dual-channel supply chain with in one manufacturer M who establishes the electronic direct channel and two retailers R1 and R2, as shown in Figure 1 
The optimal values of all parameters are marked by using the upper-right "*", which *= I, II and III, respectively, is the value of the optimal decision-making in foregoing three different cases: retailers R 1 and R 2 are involved in information sharing, the retailer R 1 involved in information sharing while R 2 does not participate in information sharing, and retailers R 1 and R 2 are not involved in information sharing.
Assumed that demand functions satisfy a linear relationship, retailers and manufacturer's demand functions in dual-channel supply chain system with a value-added of services and free transfer between
channels are as follows. The demand function of retailer R 1 1
The demand function of Retailer R 2 2   2  2 3 2  2  2  2  2  3  2  2 ( , , ) (
The demand function of manufacturer 3 3 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 3
Where a i (i = 1,2,3) indicates the basic market demand of the different retail price; price fluctuation coefficient b indicated that the marginal price-sensitive demand coefficient; i  (i = 1,2) expresses the marginal retail demand of retailer value-added of services;  is diffusion intensity to shift between the two channels with regards to the price and value-added, that is, the customers feel the difference of the price and value added between channels and they randomly shift between the two channels in proportion to (Tsay and To simplify calculation, the marginal costs of the various stages in supply chain are omitted. The retailers and the manufacturer's profits functions are as follows, in which the manufacturer's profits include the profits from retailers and its own direct sales profits.
The profits function of Retailer R 1 :
The profits function of Retailer R 2 :
The profits function of Manufacturer:
The total profits function of the supply chain system:
Model Solution
The following idea is to solve the model: using backwards induction in game theory solves the three sub-models. Every specific uncertain private information t i is different during the process of solving sub-model. If one does not know t i , its expectation 0 will replace t i in the corresponding sub-model solution. Solving the model satisfies the following expression: 
Because retailers R 1 and R 2 are independent of each other and both know private uncertain demand information, their decision-making solution processes are identical for retailers R 1 and R 2 whether to participate in information sharing or not and only the meaning of value of p 1 ,w 1 ,w 3 is different from one another for three different sub-models. The key difference of information-sharing in the foregoing three cases is the manufacturer's decision-making process and ultimate profit distribution mechanism. Then the following expression is based on different information sharing cases to obtain appropriate optimal solution for manufacture. .Therefore, there is the following proposition. Proposition 1 For retailer R 1 whether to participate in information sharing or not, the manufacturer's wholesale price w 1 , his optimal equilibrium of decision-making on retail price p 1 and value-added of services v 1 are as follows respectively:
Due to the length of paper, the proofs of propositions are omitted
The Decision-making of Retailer R 2
Similarly to retailer R 1 , whenever retailer R 2 whether participates in information sharing or does not, retailer R 2 according to his own principles of profit-maximizing and wholesale price w 2 from manufacturer decides the retail price p 2 and the value-added of services v 2 , which is to solve . Proposition 2 For retailer R 2 whether to participate in information sharing, the manufacturer's wholesale price w 2 , his optimal equilibrium of decision-making on retail price p 2 and value-added of services v 2 are as follows respectively:
According to Proposition 1 and 2 the following Lemma can be drawn: Lemma 1 Retailer R 1 and R 2 are independent of each other and in accordance with the principles of their own profit-maximizing decide their value-added of services, but their value-added is equal in order to compete with each other. Lemma 2 Decision-making of value-added for retailers is not correlative with demand uncertain factor t i but only the cost coefficient of value-added , price fluctuation coefficient b, value-added fluctuation coefficient i  and channel diffusion intensity .
The Decision-making of Manufacturer
Based on whether the two retailers participate in information sharing, decision-making of the manufacturer is completely different in the foregoing three different situations because the manufacturer's ability to access to the retailers' private uncertain demand information is different. The following decision-making conditions are discussed and solved according to different cases.
Retailers R 1 and R 2 are involved in information sharing
When retailers R 1 and R 2 are involved in information sharing, the manufacturer knows the uncertain market information t 1 of retailers R 1 and t 2 of retailers R 2 , and he gives the same wholesale price to retailers w 1 =w 2 = s w . The following propositions and conclusions can be obtained by solving the manufacturer's decision problem. 
Substitute the conclusions of Proposition 3 into the Propositions 1 and 2 to get the following conclusion. Proposition 4 When retailers R 1 and R 2 both participate in information sharing, the optimal equilibrium of decision-making on retailers' retail price and value-added of services is as follows: 
Retailer R 1 to participate in information sharing while R 2 not to participate in information sharing
When retailer R 1 participates in information sharing while retailer R 2 does not, the manufacturer does not know uncertain market information t 2 of retailer R 2 but does uncertain market information t 1 of retailer R 1 and wholesale prices to retailers are different w 1 <w 2 . The following propositions and conclusions can be got by solving the manufacturer's decision problem. 
Proposition 5
The optimal equilibrium of decision -making on the retail price p 3 of manufacturer's direct channel, wholesale price w 1 for retailer R 1 to participate in information sharing and wholesale price w2 for retailer R 2 not to participate in information sharing are as follows:
Substitute the conclusions of Proposition 5 into the Propositions 1 and 2 to draw the following conclusion. Proposition 6 When retailer R 1 participates in information sharing while retailer R 2 does not, the optimal equilibrium of decision-making on retailers' retail price and value-added of services are as follows:
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Retailers R 1 and R 2 are not involved in information sharing
When retailers R 1 and R 2 are not involved in information sharing, the manufacturer does not knows the uncertain market information t 1 of retailers R 1 and t 2 of retailers R 2 , and he gives the same wholesale price to retailers w 1 =w 2 = u w . The following propositions and conclusions can be reached by solving the manufacturer's decision problem. 
Proposition 7
The optimal equilibriums of decision -making on the retail price p 3 of manufacturer's direct channel and wholesale price u w for neither retailer to participate in information sharing are as follows:
Substitute the conclusions of Proposition 7 into the Propositions 1 and 2 to get the following conclusion. Proposition 8 When neither retailer R 1 and R 2 participate in information sharing, the optimal equilibrium of decision-making on retailers' retail price and value-added of services are as follows:
The Benefits Distribution Mechanism
The foregoing three different situations are based on whether the two retailers participate in information sharing. Propositions 3-8 respectively substitute for the corresponding profit functions of manufacturer, retailers R 1 and R 2 to get the following profits distribution mechanism. Proposition 9 When retailers R 1 and R 2 both participate in information sharing, the profits of manufacturer, retailers R 1 and R 2 are as follows: 2  2  2  2  3  1  2  1  2  1  2  2  3   1  2  3 1  2  3  3  3  1  2  3 1  2  3 1 2  2  2  2  2  3  1  1  1  2  3   2  2  2  2  2  3  1  3  2  2 2 2 
Proposition 11
When neither of retailers R 1 and R 2 participates in information sharing, the profits of manufacturer, retailers R 1 and R 2 are as follows: 
Conclusion
This paper studies an information sharing model in hybrid dual-channel supply chain, which includes two retailers and one manufacturer with the electronic direct marketing. Based on whether the two retailers take part in the information sharing, there are three different information-sharing sub-models for the optimal solution and Game Equilibrium Analysis: retailers R1 and R2 are both involved in information sharing; retailer R1 participates in information sharing while retailer R2 does not participate in information sharing; neither retailer R1 nor R2 is involved in information sharing. The optimal results and analysis show that in e-commerce environment uncertain demand information sharing impacts on profits in supply chain, but it can not completely assure to increase the total profit in supply chain, which is only fit for the specific conditions, so the appropriate mechanisms of information sharing must be designed to maximize their total benefits in dual channel supply chain in e-commerce environment. The coordination between traditional channels and electronic channels is associated with the basic demand and uncertain demand of retailers, which is requested to fit for complex certain conditions. The stabile equilibrium conditions of price discrimination strategy are correlated to the basic demand and demand uncertainty of retailers, so price discrimination strategy can be used as an effective means to design information sharing mechanism in dual-channel, supply chain in e-commerce environment.
Further research work is to design incentive mechanism of partial information sharing in specific situation which is retailer R 1 to participate in information sharing and R 2 retailer not to participate in information sharing in dual-channel supply chain in e-business environment, the pricing incentives model of partial information sharing in dual-channel supply chain with demand uncertainty, and the pricing incentive model of partial information sharing for multiple retailers in dual-channel supply chain.
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